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Puerto Ricans as Contingent Citizens:  
Shifting Mandated Identities and         
Imperial Disjunctures
PEDRO CABÁN
The author (pcaban@albany.edu) is Professor and Chair of  Latin American, Caribbean and U.S. Latino 
Studies at the University of  Albany (SUNY). His research is on the political economy of  colonialism 
with a focus on Puerto Rico, U.S. Latina/o political engagement, and public higher education and 
American political development. He is author of  Constructing a Colonial People, the United States and Puerto 
Rico (Westview, 1999).
ABSTRACT
In 1917 the United States Congress imposed citizenship on the inhabitants of  Puerto 
Rico. It was a contingent citizenship subject to legal redefi nition and tailored to Puerto 
Rico’s colonial status within the U.S. empire. Many scholars have argued that racism 
was determinative in the decision to consign Puerto Ricans a diminished citizenship. 
But it is necessary to point out that the U.S. had crafted an adaptive racial narrative that 
distinguished among racialized people under its sovereignty in terms of  their capacities for 
self-government and ability to comprehend Anglo-Saxon political and legal institutions. 
Moreover, in addition to racism, strategic considerations and territorial policies and legal 
precedents fi gured prominently in the decision to impose an unprecedented citizenship 
status on Puerto Ricans. [Keywords: citizenship, colonialism, territorial incorporation, 
statehood, imperialism]
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In theory, citizenship denotes intrinsic status, signifying both full membership in the 
political community and a set of rights that adhere inherently and equally to all 
citizens. In practice, however, the rights of citizenship are variable and differentiated, 
and governments often approach citizenship not as a fundamental birthright or 
basic legal status but rather as a policy tool that is subject to constant adaptation, 
alteration, and modifi cation. 
Wilem Maas
U.S. policy on territorial incorporation was well developed before the War of 1898, and 
influenced the emerging empire’s colonial policy in Puerto Rico. Congress and the 
courts understood that Constitution mandated that territories acquired by 
the United States would inevitably be incorporated into the union as states. 
Moreover, with very rare exceptions the inhabitants of  these territories would 
be collectively naturalized. However, in those cases in which the majority 
of  the inhabitants of  territories held by the United States were not white, 
Congress debated the wisdom of  conferring citizenship to these “lesser races.” 
The race, nationality and language of  the territorial inhabitants factored into 
the federal government’s decision on the conferral of  citizenship and the 
timing of  a territory’s admission into the union. While racial considerations 
were significant in shaping policy toward the territories, they were not decisive 
in every instance. The decision as to which racialized inhabitants of  the 
territories should be granted collective citizenship was also contingent on the 
territory’s import for the evolving American empire. This paper was motivated 
in part by the conceptual and interpretive difficulties that arise if  racism is 
used as the primary motivation to explain U.S. policy toward the territories, 
particularly the collective naturalization of  the non-white inhabitants of  these 
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territories. Clearly racism was important in framing overall U.S. policy toward 
the insular possessions acquired in 1898, but it was not decisive in explaining 
the treatment of  Puerto Rico and its people. 
The American imperial project (1776 to 1917) was based on a pragmatic 
stratagem of  incorporation and exclusion of  different ethnicities and races (as 
well as the singular denial of  equality for women) from the body politic (see 
Smith 1997). While Manifest Destiny was based on notions of  providential 
inevitability, the treatment of  the inhabitants of  territories pertaining to the 
United States was guided by the unquestioned belief  in Anglo-Saxon racial 
superiority. The entire American project was driven by the relegation of  non-
Caucasians to the political and economic periphery. However, as I will attempt 
to show in this paper, U.S. empire builders did make distinctions about the 
innate capacities of  the racialized inhabitants of  occupied territories, and the 
functions they would be assigned in the American imperial project. 
U.S. expansionist and imperialist narratives glorified Anglo-Saxon 
supremacy and rationalized the racial subordination of  non-white peoples. By 
the late 19th century belief  in the superiority of  Anglo-Saxon America was 
ingrained in the national consciousness, and formed the basis for a robust 
militaristic nationalism. Naturally, all non-white peoples were considered 
deficient and lacking the attributes for self-government, let alone the capacity to 
grasp the genius of  Anglo-Saxon institutions. Indeed, until well after the Civil 
War whiteness itself  was socially constructed as the exclusive attribute of  Anglo 
Saxons. After acquiring Spain’s colonies, the practices and policies of  the U.S. 
government left no doubt that people who were racialized as non-white would 
simply not be incorporated into the body political as equal citizens. Indeed, 
racial exclusion was deeply embedded in the states that comprised the Union. 
The states acted with impunity in deciding who would be granted full political 
membership in the polity. Not withstanding the 15th amendment, the federal 
government did not act until two decades after World War II to intercede 
at the state level to protect the citizenship rights of  African Americans. The 
grant of  U.S. citizenship to non-white people did not alter the entrenched and 
widely held conviction that non-Caucasian people are inherently inferior and 
consequently not worthy of  recognition as political equals. 
Racism was constitutive of  the uninterrupted extermination, enslavement, 
displacement and subjugation, and eventual colonization of  non-white 
populations in the evolution of  the American empire. An often-violent racism 
justified the “attendant cruelties” the U.S. inflicted on non-white people as 
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the nation prosecuted its quest for global dominance.1 However, how decisive 
was racism in determining territorial policy during the period of  continuous 
expansion that culminated in the acquisition of  the “insular possessions” from 
Spain? This is one of  the questions I explore in the course of  reviewing the 
evolution of  U.S. territorial policy leading to the establishment of  the colony of  
Puerto Rico (see Burnett and Marshall 2001; Neuman and Brown-Nagin 2015).
In a seminal article that provoked a reconsideration of  the scholarship 
on racism, sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva argued that racism is “the racial 
ideology of  a racialized social system.” Racism is an ideological attribute, or 
structural property, of  the social system and “not an all-powerful ideology 
that explains all racial phenomena in a society” (Bonilla-Silva 1997, 467). 
In other words, racism is derivative of  the racialized social system. Racism 
is not reducible simply to ideas. In these social systems actors are placed in 
racial categories or races by the “race” that has achieved the superordinate 
position. Bonilla-Silva’s conceptual approach enhances our understanding of  
the evolution of  U.S. territorial policy and practice because it overcomes the 
analytical tendency to portray racism as invariant over time and space. 
Racial Ideologies and Exclusion
Racial ideology informed the imperialists’ reasoning on where to position 
different subject populations in the evolving racial hierarchy of  the new 
empire. Nineteenth-century narratives of  U.S. territorial expansion often 
depict racism as a fixed variable with which to explain the depiction and 
treatment of  all non-white peoples. Yet a review of  government documents, 
scholarly articles of  the period, speeches by prominent legislators, treaties, 
court proceedings and congressional debates suggests that in the elaboration 
of  territorial policy, U.S. policymakers did make racial distinctions among 
subject peoples. Racial ideology, although a structural attribute of  a racialized 
social system, evolved as a consequence of  the imperialists’ exposure to and 
experience with different subject populations. Moreover, as the U.S. empire 
expanded its global reach, racial ideology appropriated a contingent quality. 
Simply put, the changing function of  a racialized group in the imperial project 
precipitated a redefinition or refinement on where that racialized group would 
be positioned in the racial hierarchy. 
242 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXIX • NUMBER I • 2017
The literature on U.S. territorial expansion and imperialism provides insights into how 
subject peoples were differentially positioned during different moments in the evolution of  
the U.S. empire.
Portrayals of  the same racialized group varied over time as well. In a 
recent article Charles Venator-Santiago describes the contingent nature of  the 
collective citizenship imposed on Puerto Ricans by postulating a relationship 
between distinct legal constructions of  citizenship for Puerto Ricans and 
stages of  the United States evolution as a global empire (Venator-Santiago 
2013, 93–94). The literature on U.S. territorial expansion and imperialism 
provides insights into how subject peoples were differentially positioned 
during different moments in the evolution of  the U.S. empire. By envisioning 
racism as a flexible and adaptive racial ideology, we can intimate that empire 
builders positioned the inhabitants of  territories in different racial categories 
in order to advance particular policy objectives or political goals. Policymakers 
in Washington and territorial administrators consistently portrayed all the non-
white inhabitants of  annexed territories as racially inferior to Anglo Saxons. 
However, these elites also debated the wisdom of  granting U.S. citizenship 
to Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Tejanos, Hawaiians, Native Americans, 
Chinese, and other non-Anglo American populations because of  presumed 
innate differences among these racialized people. 
Returning to the question of  racial factors in the making of  U.S. colonial 
policy, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos were initially targets of  racial scorn and 
portrayed as inferior tropical people who threatened the purity and health 
of  the white race. Despite this general characterization, Congress was quick 
to signal its intention to exclude Filipinos from membership in the United 
States. The Americans revealed the depth of  their antipathy for Filipinos when 
Congress speedily approved a joint resolution only a week after the Treaty of  
Paris. The resolution stated the Treaty “was not intended to incorporate the 
inhabitants of  the Philippine Islands into citizenship of  the United States… 
nor to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of  the territory of  
the United States” (Capó-Rodríguez 1919a, 510). In contrast, the initial draft 
of  the 1900 Foraker Act granted collective citizenship to the inhabitants of  
Puerto Rico. Although this provision was removed in a subsequent version of  
the bill, it was because of  Congressional uncertainty that a precedent could 
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be established that would legally compel the United States to grant Filipinos 
citizenship (Capó-Rodríguez 1919b, 555). Senator Foraker wrote in his memoirs 
that he lobbied to include the provision for U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans 
in his bill, but stiff  resistance in the Senate prompted him to substitute the 
concept “citizens of  Porto Rico and as such entitled to the protection of  the 
United States.” Subsequent to the enactment of  the 1900 Organic Act, Foraker 
reported, “he sought several times ... to secure an amendment to the law that 
would make citizens of  the United States.” He also noted that by 1908 the 
Republican Party’s “sentiment” for citizenship had “radically changed” when it 
endorsed in its platform “that the native inhabitants of  Porto Rico should be 
at once made collectively citizens of  the United States” (Foraker 1916). In his 
monumental study of  U.S. citizenship, Rogers Smith concluded that Congress 
had consigned Filipinos to a status comparable to that of  Chinese ––“too 
racially distinct, inferior, troublesome to possess any form of  U.S. citizenship 
or nationality.” Filipinos were placed in a category of  people that should be 
denied entry to the United States and subject to expulsion (Smith 1997, 429). 
Colonial policy toward the insular possessions was influenced by fear 
that the territorial incorporation Philippines would threaten the American 
workers and businesses. Representatives Gilbert and Sibley provocatively 
uttered their racial fear about “10,000,000 Asiatics becoming American citizens 
and swarming into this country.” Sibley declared that “the yellow man of  
the Orient shall not come here, clothed with the full power of  citizenship” 
(quoted in Cabán 1999, 88). These were not isolated outbursts of  anti-Asian 
xenophobia, but expressive of  widespread sentiment in a nation assured of  its 
racial superiority. Yet a nation alarmed about the pollution of  its racial purity 
if  the inferior stock of  humanity that populated the possessions were to be 
incorporated into the union. Senator Foraker emphasized that the Philippine 
tariff  issue had to be resolved so that the people of  the United States know 
“that the labor and the industry of  this country shall be protected from what 
has been charged as the unjust completion of  the Malay in the Philippines and 
the products of  Malay cheap labor” (Foraker 1900). The 1900 Democratic 
Party convention condemned the imperialist policies of  the McKinley 
administration, and reaffirmed the Democrat’s disaggregated racial views 
about the inhabitants of  U.S. territories. The Democratic platform warned 
that “Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; they 
cannot be subjects without imperiling our form of  government” (Democratic 
National Convention 1900, 115). Democratic presidential candidate William 
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Jennings Bryan questioned whether the Republican controlled Congress 
intended to “bring into the body politic eight or ten million Asiatics, so different 
from us in race and history that amalgamation is impossible?” (Democratic 
National Convention 1900, 213). In contrast, the Democratic Party expressed 
its support for “home rule and a territorial form of  government for Alaska 
and Porto Rico.” They denounced the “Porto Rican Law” (the Foraker Act) 
enacted by the Republican controlled Congress because it “dooms to poverty 
and distress a people whose helplessness appeals with peculiar force to our 
justice and magnanimity” (Democratic National Platform 1900, 114, 250).
Attributing undue influence to racism in the formulation of  colonial policy 
overlooks important economic and political considerations that interacted with 
race and shaped the national discourse on the possessions and their people. 
For example, intense debates between economic protectionists and proponents 
of  free trade occupied Congress’s deliberations on the possessions, and bore 
directly on the issue of  whether the uniformity clause of  the Constitution 
applied to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The resolution of  tariff  debate 
was contingent on whether the courts ruled that the possessions were either 
incorporated or non-incorporated territories. The impact of  free trade and 
unrestricted migration was interpreted both as a racial issue and a profoundly 
important economic matter. In the protectionist mindset of  the time, American 
manufacturers feared competition with cheap tropical products and produce 
if  allowed duty-free entry into the U.S. market. American labor unions feared 
that unrestricted migration of  cheap labor from the possessions would further 
threaten the already precarious condition of  U.S. workers. Legislators intensely 
debated the morality of  holding the inhabitants of  the possessions in colonial 
servitude. In the case of  Puerto Rico, U.S. strategic considerations factored 
into the deliberations that ultimately let to imposing collective citizenship on 
Puerto Ricans on the eve of  U.S. entry into World War I.
Puerto Rican racial classification and biological proximity to norms of  whiteness 
were ambiguous and hotly debated in Congress.
This is not to argue that Puerto Ricans were not racialized as inferior to 
Anglo Saxons. Admittedly, both Puerto Ricans and Filipinos were victims 
of  an idea that they were alien people and should be excluded from full 
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membership in the Union (Meléndez 2013, 108). However, the degree of  
exclusion and perceptions of  the extent to which Puerto Ricans and Filipinos 
were alien to United States differed. Puerto Rican racial classification and 
biological proximity to norms of  whiteness were ambiguous and hotly 
debated in Congress. Interpreting racism as a racial ideology and not as a 
fixed belief  system that stands apart from the social structure is a fruitful step 
in disaggregating the racial narratives that were deployed by imperialists to 
rationalize their treatment of  non-white people in the insular possessions and 
other acquired territories. Rethinking racism as ideology also helps decipher 
the contingent properties of  collective naturalization.
Lanny Thompson has written a thorough analysis of  the popular and 
academic literature on the evolution of  U.S. policy for the insular possessions, 
published in the years preceding the Insular Cases. Thompson notes that, 
with the acquisition of  Spain’s insular possessions, the “United States had 
surpassed the limits of  its settler expansion,” and now faced an imperial 
problem. Citing the work of  Fredrick Coudert, Jr., Thompson agrees that 
the critical issues facing empire builders was “How were the new possessions 
to be ruled, and what would be the political status of  their inhabitants?” He 
observes that the historical scholarship has not adequately addressed the issue 
of  the “differences among and within the new possessions” (Thompson 2002, 
538). Coudert did not believe there were “adequate or guiding precedents in 
our former territorial acquisitions” to guide insular policy. Moreover, he argued 
that the racial and cultural characteristics of  the inhabitants of  the possessions 
were so different as “to make the application of  any uniform system difficult 
if  not impracticable.” Unlike the Mexican and French territories, the insular 
possessions brought the United States “face to face with the real imperial 
problem, i.e. the domination over men of  one order or kind of  civilization 
by men of  a different and higher civilization” (Coudert Jr. 1903, 13). Yale 
law Professor Simeon E. Baldwin expressed a seemingly common notion 
that the inhabitants of  the insular possessions were incapable of  appreciating 
the superiority of  American institutions. He confidently asserted that, “Our 
Constitution was made by a civilized and educated people. It provides 
guaranties of  personal security which seem ill adapted to the conditions of  
society that prevail in many parts of  our new possessions.” Baldwin wrote 
that the half-civilized Moros of  the Philippines, or the ignorant and lawless 
brigands that infest Puerto Rico,” were incapable of  benefitting from the 
extension of  the Constitution (Baldwin 1899, 415).
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Thompson’s seminal article faults scholars who uncritically rely on the 
history of  U.S. treatment of  racialized populations in the continent to explain 
the racial underpinnings of  U.S. insular territorial policy. More pointedly, and 
relevant to this analysis, Thompson questions Efrén Rivera’s thesis that the 
“otherness” of  the people of  Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Philippines explains 
why the United States treated each of  the territories so differently. The notion 
of  “otherness” as the primary factor for the Supreme Court’s creation of  the 
doctrine of  incorporation, “while illuminating, is too general to explain the 
particular manifestations of  imperial rule in the different sites” (Thompson 
2002, 538)
Congress and the War Department regularly received reports from their 
emissaries and military officers that described the cultural, racial, and social 
characteristics of  the inhabitants of  the insular possessions. While government 
officials acknowledged that these differences would result in divergent 
treatment for each of  the insular possessions, of  greater consequence for 
them was how these possessions affected the strategic, commercial and 
domestic political interests of  the United States. In other words, while policy 
toward the possession was invariably racially justified, the actual content of  
policy was guided by a wide array of  factors, including the capacity of  the 
colonized to resist and alter colonial rule. Studies that emphasize racism as the 
dominant factor for denying Puerto Ricans territorial incorporation and its 
people full citizenship suggest that the federal government lacks the capacity 
to strategically recast racial identities in order to advance specific geopolitical 
or economic objectives. But in fact, it was precisely the contrived racial 
distinctions and capacities between Puerto Ricans and Filipinos that were used 
to rationalize the imposition of  profoundly different colonial policies for these 
insular possessions. Legislators accepting the manufactured racial narratives 
that diminished Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, but in the final analysis it was the 
overarching framework of  imperial ambitions, economic consequences and 
domestic political considerations that determined the distinctive treatment 
of  the people of  these possessions as racialized subjects. How racism was 
deployed by U.S. officials was contingent on the role colonial subjects were 
assigned in the evolving U.S. global empire. 
247Puerto Ricans as Contingent Citizens • Pedro Cabán
Exclusionary Territorial Policy for the Insular Possessions
Prior to the 1898 Treaty of  Paris, United States territorial policy adhered to 
the Constitution’s territorial clause granting Congress the “power to dispose 
and make all meaningful rules and regulations” respecting the nation’s 
territorial possessions. Since the Constitution did not explicitly grant Congress 
authority to administer territories in perpetuity, the standing doctrine held that 
all territories would eventually be admitted into the union as states and its 
inhabitants would be granted citizenship. This all changed with the acquisition 
of  Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Luella Gettys, in “The Law of  Citizenship 
in the United States,” noted that the “political status of  the Philippine Islands 
and of  Puerto Rico has presented perplexing questions ever since the transfer 
of  these territories to the United States (Gettys 1934, 146–47). According to 
Gettys, “naturalization by treaty is a common method of  effective collective 
naturalization.” Prior to the 1898 Treaty of  Paris, every treaty that ceded 
territory to the Untied States “contained some provision to admit to United 
States citizenship of  some or all of  the inhabitants” (Gettys 1934, 144).
In a speech before the Senate, Senator Foraker acknowledged that the 
insular possessions were being treated differently from the treatment of  
former territories. He said that “ordinarily in the acquisition of  territory 
heretofore by treaty there has been an express stipulation that that territory 
and the inhabitants should be incorporated into the Union. In this case 
there is no such stipulation” (Foraker 1900). Foraker sought to minimize the 
significance of  refusing to incorporate the newly acquired insular possessions. 
He claimed that the 1803 Treaty for the purchase of  Louisiana set the standard 
“as to what the power of  Congress is to legislate for acquired territory and 
this act certainly ought to be a standard by which we have a right to measure 
the provisions we are now proposing for Puerto Rico.” According to Foraker, 
the same legislation was enacted for Florida and Hawaii (Foraker 1900). 
Perry Belmont, a New York Congressman and Minister to Spain, questioned 
Foraker’s reasoning. He argued that “the treatment of  the native inhabitants 
of  our new islands… is quite unlike the treatment of  the native inhabitants 
stipulated in the treaties of  cession concluded with France, Spain, Mexico and 
Russia” (Belmont 1900, 10).
By 1898 the federal government had established a century-old history 
of  territorial incorporation under which Congress held plenary powers over 
the administration of  these territories. A long experience with the non-white 
inhabitants of  the territories influenced Congressional treatment of  the 
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inhabitants of  Puerto Rico and the Philippines. It is useful at this point to 
review key elements of  U.S. territorial policy prior to the acquisition of  Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines. The Constitution was decidedly vague about the 
content of  territorial policy, leaving it up to Congress to interpret how this 
founding document should be used to administer the territories and determine 
the political status of  their inhabitants. 
The policies and practices that Congress commonly employed included; 
the denial of  full political equality to inhabitants racialized as non-white and the 
framing of  citizenship policy as it applied to them, promoting the migration of  
white settlers into territories with the aim of  displacing the original inhabitants 
of  the territories, and delaying the admission of  territories into the union 
until the majority of  the inhabitants were Caucasian. Displacement entailed 
the virtual eradication of  the economic and political power of  non-white 
elites in the acquired territories, and their effective removal as impediments to 
the realization of  America’s manifest destiny. Congress exhibited a cautious 
inclination to grant collective naturalization to non-white inhabitants of  
incorporated territories, but denied admitting these territories into union if  
the inhabitants posed a challenge to the establishment of  a white supremacist 
order. As I will argue below, the foremost obstacle to a territory’s admission 
into the union was existence of  a majority non-white population that had 
acquired citizenship through collective naturalization. 
To justify its exclusionary and politically authoritarian policies, the United 
States government espoused racially based depictions of  non-Caucasians as 
lacking the necessary attributes for self-government. For example, Congress 
refused to admit New Mexico and Arizona to the union on the grounds that 
the majority Mexican population was incapable of  self-government because of  
their Spanish heritage. By the early 1880s the United States had a well-defined, 
clearly xenophobic opposition to Chinese immigration, and these anti-Asian 
predispositions were readily extended to the inhabitants of  the Philippines. 
Filipinos were also portrayed as absolutely incapable of  comprehending 
Anglo Saxon institutions. Reverend Charles Pierce, claimed that the “duplicity, 
falsehood and theft” which abounded in the Philippines was “probably due 
to the fact that the Spanish colonial government… was constantly exhibiting 
the same vices (American Academy of  Political and Social Science 1901, 
35). Lawrence Lowell, a prominent legal scholar and President of  Harvard 
University, whose writing influenced the federal government policy toward 
the insular possessions, stridently argued that Filipinos were incapable of  
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self-rule (see Lowell 1899a, 1899b). Indigenous populations of  the insular 
territories that were often branded as “wild, savage tribes,” were never to 
be conferred collective naturalization. The Philippine Commission reported 
that a “multiplicity of  tribes” inhabited the archipelago, characterized by 
“multifarious phases of  civilization—ranging all the way from the highest to 
the lowest.” The Commission warned that the Philippines would be engulfed 
in anarchy if  the United States were to withdraw. “Only through American 
occupation… is the idea of  a free self-governing Philippine commonwealth at 
all conceivable” (United States. Philippine Commission 1899, 14, 15). Long-
standing derogatory portrayals of  non-white subject populations formed a 
racial context for the Anglo-American political leadership to depict Puerto 
Ricans as incapable of  comprehending republican institutions and devoid of  
the capacity for self-government. 
Much of  the academic literature on the question of  citizenship for Puerto Rico emphasized 
the absence of  a historical precedent for incorporating the insular territories.
Congressional debates pursuant to the enactment of  the Foraker Act show 
that legislators were highly motivated to disavow those territorial precedents 
and constitutional stipulations that appeared to mandate the incorporation of  
the insular possessions and the conferral of  collective citizenship. Much of  the 
academic literature on the question of  citizenship for Puerto Rico emphasized 
the absence of  a historical precedent for incorporating the insular territories. 
Coudert’s essay captured this tendency. The insular territories were ‘inhabited 
by a settled population differing from us in race and civilization.” According to 
Coudert, the inhabitants of  the Philippines and Puerto Rico differed “from us 
in race and civilization to such an extent that assimilation seems impossible.” 
He also noted that Puerto Ricans and Filipinos were so different “in race, 
development and culture to so great a degree as to make the application of  
any uniform political system difficult if  not impossible (Coudert Jr. 1903, 13).
Ultimately, Congress decided to treat the insular territories acquired from 
Spain very differently than it had treated territories acquired before 1898. 
While Congress considered Filipinos and Puerto Ricans as being incapable 
of  self-government, the former colonial subjects were essentially portrayed as 
irredeemable. The intensity of  legislators’ racial enmity for the inhabitants of  
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new possessions acquired in 1898 was cynically manipulated and adjusted to 
meet the policy objectives of  the political and economic forces represented in 
Congress. While overt racial antipathy was rampant in Congress, it is doubtful 
that legislators necessarily had a well-formulated and -nuanced appreciation 
of  the distinctive racial attributes of  Puerto Ricans and Filipinos. A more 
likely explanation rests with the need to create racial narratives that align 
with the empire’s different geopolitical and economic designs for the colonial 
possessions. Puerto Ricans happened to be more “white” than the Filipinos 
could ever be, and consequently were potentially redeemable. Foraker’s skill in 
devising and guiding the organic bills through Congress without diminishing 
the structure of  privileged white rule was widely recognized and applauded. 
The congratulatory note from Nicholas Murray Butler, President of  Columbia 
University and a recipient of  the Nobel Peace Prize, was characteristic of  the 
accolades Foraker garnered: “You have contributed ... to the expansion of  our 
institutions without exposing them to the danger of  disintegration through the 
operation of  strange and alien forces” (Foraker 1916).
When the Jones Act was signed into law in 1917, Puerto Ricans were 
portrayed as incapable of  effectively administering the institutions established 
by the superior Anglo-Saxon race. Although Puerto Ricans were perceived as 
a racially diverse but predominately white population, they were considered 
unsuited for self-government and citizenship because of  centuries of  deficient 
Spanish colonial rule. The notion of  citizenship and self-government were not 
linked in colonial legislation. Initial draft legislation for the Foraker provided 
for U.S. citizenship for the inhabitants of  Puerto Rico, but imposed a colonial 
state that deprived Puerto Ricans of  any genuine role in their self-government. 
The Jones Act defined Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens, who owed allegiance 
and loyalty to the United States, but only superficially loosened the reigns 
of  colonial rule. The granting of  collective citizenship did not mean that 
Congress had finally acknowledged that Puerto Ricans had proven themselves 
capable of  self-government, not withstanding its banal declarations that the 
Jones Act increased the autonomy of  Puerto Ricans to manage their affairs.
Downes v Bidwell (1901) perverted legally accepted principles of  territorial 
incorporation to create a novel territorial category in order to deny the 
inhabitants of  the insular possessions collective naturalization. Once the 
anomaly of  unincorporated territory was sanctioned in law, Puerto Ricans 
and Filipinos could be denied the privileges and responsibilities accorded by 
the Constitution to inhabitants of  incorporated territories. Congressional 
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power to rule over the territories was essentially unrestricted. Territorial non-
incorporation made the provision of  collective naturalization optional, and 
Congress was under no obligation to extend U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. 
But if  Congress chose to confer U.S. citizenship, this citizenship need notenable 
“both full membership in the political community and a set of  rights that adhere 
inherently and equally to all citizens.” Edgardo Melendez has identified the 
statutory collective naturalization Congress enacted as resulting in the creation 
of  “colonial citizenship,” a citizenship that was specific to the inhabitants of  a 
territorial possession subject to the plenary powers of  Congress. 
Despite his efforts to portray colonial policy toward Puerto Rico as 
benevolent and liberal, Foraker did make it clear that the insular possessions 
were “mere dependencies of  the United States, and that Congress has not 
only an inherent, but constitutional, power to legislate, and … to govern 
these particular acquisitions as Congress may see fit (Foraker 1900). John K. 
Richards, Solicitor General of  the United States in 1901, argued before the 
Supreme Court as it deliberated the case of  Downes v Bidwell, “that a careful 
examination of  the Constitution leads but to one conclusion, that the power 
of  Congress over the Territories is plenary and absolute.” He emphasized that 
the territorial clause permitted Congress to administer territories “unhampered 
by those limitations and restrictions which were intended to apply only to States 
in the Union” (Howe 1901, 703). The Supreme Court unreservedly agreed. 
The Constitution has undoubtedly conferred on Congress the right to create such 
municipal organizations as it may deem best for all the territories of  the United 
States, whether they have been incorporated or not, …to deprive such territory of  
representative government if  it is considered just to do so, and to change such local 
governments at its discretion.
The Insular Cases displayed how the Supreme Court shrewdly interpreted 
the Constitution to advance the American empire. The singular legacy of  
the insular cases was the reaffirmation that the territorial clause of  the 
Constitution endowed Congress with virtually unrestricted plenary powers 
to administer Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and that this body is solely 
responsible for determining the political status of  the people of  Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines. Collective naturalization in 1917 for Puerto Ricans, the 
inhabitants of  the unincorporated territory, came with severely restricted 
political rights, and was unprecedented in the history of  U.S. territorial 
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expansion. It was a geographically specific citizenship for inhabitants of  
Puerto Rico—in other words, a citizenship that had no meaning once the 
colonial subject migrated and established residence in the United States. Legal 
scholar Efrén Rivera Ramos neatly observes that “citizenship did not deface 
colonialism.” Collective naturalization did not diminish the plenary powers 
Congress to continue to hold the new “American citizens” in conditions of  
legal and political subordination. Significantly, Rivera Ramos notes that Balzac v 
Puerto Rico reaffirmed that the U.S. could disassociate citizenship from territory. 
Congress possessed the legal authority to confer citizenship to the inhabitants 
of  territories under the sovereignty of  the United States without an obligation 
to incorporate those territories into the Union (Rivera Ramos 2001, 47–54).
When the Jones Act conferred collective citizenship to Puerto Ricans, Congress effectively 
eradicated the basis for Puerto Ricans to make the legal claim of  a distinctive Puerto Rican 
nationality that would be recognized by the courts.
Moreover, in theory and in practice Congress effectively claimed the 
extraordinary authority to redefine Puerto Rican nationality. When the Jones 
Act conferred collective citizenship to Puerto Ricans, Congress effectively 
eradicated the basis for Puerto Ricans to make the legal claim of  a distinctive 
Puerto Rican nationality that would be recognized by the courts. Under the 
provision of  collective citizenship, anyone establishing a residence in Puerto 
Rico was considered an inhabitant of  the possession and subject to the 
same treatment as indigenous Puerto Ricans. The insular government was 
obligated to treat all the inhabitants of  Puerto Rico as equals before the law. 
Rivera Ramos astutely commented that “locality and not the status of  the 
people became the determinative criterion” regarding the applicability of  
constitutional provisions (Rivera Ramos 2001, 98). The Puerto Rican jurist 
Pedro Capó-Rodríguez similarly observed that “Puerto Rican citizenship is a 
purely local status depending on all local citizenship in the United States, upon 
residence in the place. When a Puerto Rican acquired residence in another 
place, he ceases for all legal purposes to be a citizen of  Puerto Rico (1919a, 
510).The imposition of  U.S. citizenship whose intrinsic status was contingent 
on locality trivialized Puerto Rican nationality and diminished the citizenship 
status they enjoyed under Article 1 of  the 1897 Charter of  Autonomy. This 
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provision granted full Spanish citizenship status to the native-born inhabitants 
of  Puerto Rico (see Malavet 2008, 33–34). The Supreme Court and Congress 
legally created a new political subject and justified their rationale for doing so 
on contradictory grounds. Puerto Ricans were an alien and foreign people 
that could not be incorporated in the Union, but by migrating to the U.S. 
they would acquire the same legal rights as native-born or naturalized citizens. 
It was a perverse logic. It was precisely because of  their distinctive cultural 
attributes that Puerto Ricans were deemed “alien” and “foreign,” and that was 
the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision to deny Puerto Rico incorporated 
territorial status. Congress delayed the collective naturalization of  Puerto 
Rico’s people for seventeen years, until national security compelled it to rethink 
Puerto Rican’s political status within an expanding empire.
Congressional Power and the Administration of the Territories
The proposition that inhabitants of  U.S. territories were subject to the plenary 
powers of  Congress and had no rights, save fundamental rights and those 
conferred by Congress, was debated when the Louisiana and Florida territories 
were acquired. In the 1873 Supreme Court case, Snow v United States, the 
justices decided that Congress had plenary powers to rule the territories. 
The government of  the territories of  the United States belongs primarily to Congress 
and secondarily to such agencies as Congress may establish for that purpose. During 
the term of  their pupilage as territories, they are mere dependencies of  the United 
States. Their people do not constitute a sovereign power. All political authority 
exercised therein is derived from the general government.
In 1885 the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Congress had virtually 
unlimited power to administer the territories, and that the inhabitants of  the 
territory had no constitutional right to vote, and thus select their political 
leadership. The court decided in Murphy v Ramsey that “the people of  the 
United States, as sovereign owners of  the national territories, have supreme 
power over them and their inhabitants.” The court noted “their political rights 
are franchises which they hold as privileges in the legislative discretion of  the 
Congress of  the United States.” The authority of  Congress was “subject only 
to such restrictions as are expressed in the Constitution.” 
However, the Constitution did not provide for territorial incorporation 
into the union (see Thompson 2002). Congress could conceivably draw on 
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the precedent of  the Northwest Ordinance of  1787 to guide its territorial 
policy. Article 5 provided for the establishment of  up to five states in the 
Ohio territory acquired from Great Britain in the 1783 Treaty of  Paris. Once 
the organized territory had attained a population of  “sixty thousand free 
inhabitants,” it could petition for admission into the Continental Congress 
on an equal basis as the original thirteen colonies. Admission into the union 
would by definition collectively naturalize the inhabitants of  the new state. 
Congress could rely on the sole criterion of  a territory’s total population for 
admission into the union for future decisions on incorporation into the union. 
But since the Constitution did not contain any standard by which Congress 
was obligated to admit a territory into the Union, Congress was unrestrained 
on how it chose to treat the territories. Ultimately, it was not the Constitution 
nor legal precedent, but a combination of  factors, with race being prominent, 
that influenced Congress’s decision as to a territory’s readiness for admission 
into the union. These factors were also decisive in deciding the citizenship 
status of  territorial inhabitants. 
Racial considerations factored significantly in Congress’s decision as to 
when a territory was deemed ready for admission into the union. In effect, 
Congress decided to employ the population provisions of  Article 5 selectively. 
To be sure, neither territorial incorporation nor collective naturalization 
guaranteed the timely admission of  the organized territory into the union. 
It is one of  the ironies of  U.S. nineteenth-century imperialism, that although 
Congress uniformly espoused a militant Anglo-Saxon supremacist ideology, 
it also approved incorporation and conferred collective naturalization on the 
non-white inhabitants of  territories ceded to the United States. Congress 
collectively naturalized most of  the non-white inhabitants of  the former 
territory of  Mexico (1848), the Republic of  Texas (admitted to the union in 
1845), and Hawaii (annexed in 1898). That was not the case for Alaska. 
 Alaska was purchased in 1867, but almost 50 years transpired before 
Congress passed the Organic Act of  1912 that established it as organized 
incorporated territory. Prior to its annexation as a territory, Senator Foraker 
informed his colleagues in the Senate: “It is in power of  Congress to do as 
it may like as to Alaska. Where the Constitution has not been extended and 
made the rule of  action, it is within the power of  Congress to state what 
shall be the regulation without regard to the constraints of  the Constitution” 
(1900, 30). This was claimed as precedent for the treatment of  Puerto Rico 
and its people. The treaty with Russia provided that “if  the inhabitants of  
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the territory should prefer to remain in the ceded territory, they, with the 
exception of  uncivilized native tribes, shall be admitted to the enjoyment of  
all the rights, advantages and immunities of  citizens of  the United States” 
(Gettys 1934, 146–47). The “uncivilized native tribes” were subject to a 
different set of  laws and regulations. According to a survey taken in 1870, 
the population of  Alaska numbered about 29,100, with “natives” accounting 
for about 26,800. About 1,300 of  the total population were described as “the 
actually civilized population” (Dall 1870, 537). As late as 1900 the population 
of  Alaska numbered less that 64,000, with a white population of  30,500 
(Governor Alaska 1900, 12–13). The vast majority of  Alaska’s population was 
not collectively naturalized. 
U.S. annexation of  Hawaii became a strategic imperative with the outbreak 
of  war with Spain since the islands served as a vital coaling station for U.S. 
warships steaming to the Philippines. At the urging of  President McKinley, 
Congress enacted a joint resolution to annex Hawaii. The treaty of  annexation 
prohibited Chinese immigration to the Hawaiian Islands, and “no Chinese… 
shall be allowed to enter the United States from the Hawaiian Islands.” In 
1900 McKinley signed the Hawaii Organic Act into law and incorporated the 
Hawaiian territory into the Union. Abbott Lawrence Lowell promoted the 
territorial annexation of  Hawaii. He argued that the Anglo Saxon population 
was small, “but is today, and apparently destined to remain, the ruling class in 
the island.” For this reason, “it is not improbable…that our institutions can be 
immediately applied… without modification” (Lowell 1899c, 11).
The citizenship provisions of  the Hawaiian Organic Act were 
straightforward: “All persons who were citizens of  the Republic of  Hawaii on 
August twelfth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, are hereby declared to be 
citizens of  the United States and citizens of  the Territory of  Hawaii.” In 1900 
Hawaii had a population of  154,000; the majority were Japanese and Chinese 
workers (87,877). Hawaiians and mixed heritage Hawaiians numbered about 
38,000 and other foreigners, including Puerto Ricans totaled 3,237. The census 
recorded 26,562 whites. As both U.S. and Hawaiian citizens, the inhabitants of  
Hawaii could travel freely to the United States. Granting Chinese inhabitants 
of  Hawaii U.S. citizenship and unrestricted migration within the United States 
and its territories represented a significant departure from how Chinese 
had been treated before the 1898 treaty of  annexation. The collective 
naturalization provision of  the Organic Act was also surprising given the 
highly restrictive Chinese Exclusion Act of  1882 that prohibited immigration 
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of  Chinese laborers to the U.S. It would appear that by 1898 Congress was 
unable to parse the doctrine of  territorial incorporation to selectively deny U.S. 
citizenship to Chinese inhabitants of  Hawaii. The long-standing prohibition 
against immigration of  Chinese who were not U.S. citizens was not rescinded. 
The 1882 Chinese Exclusion act was extended to Hawaii once the territory was 
annexed. Granting collective citizenship to the population of  Hawaii, in which 
whites comprised less than 20 percent, is comprehensible only because of  the 
expectations that the minority white elite would retain political and economic 
power. Congress acted quickly to annex Hawaii because of  its strategic 
significance, and to accelerate U.S. corporate investments in the sugar industry. 
Granting collective citizenship to the population of  Hawaii, in which whites comprised less 
than 20 percent, is comprehensible only because of  the expectations that the minority white 
elite would retain political and economic power.
The Treaty of  Guadalupe Hidalgo collectively naturalized Mexicans living 
in the territories Mexico was forced to relinquish to the U.S. Article VIII 
specifies that Mexicans who chose not to remain citizens of  the Mexican 
Republic “shall be incorporated into the Union of  the United States, and 
be admitted at the proper time (to be judged by the Congress of  the United 
States) to the enjoyment of  all the rights of  citizens of  the United Sates, 
according to the principles of  the Constitution.”2 The indeterminate timing 
for granting citizenship to Mexicans deviated from the citizenship provisions 
of  the Louisiana Purchase that provided for admitting the inhabitants “as soon 
as possible according to the principle of  the federal constitution.” 
Approximately 100,000 inhabitants in the former territory of  Mexico 
were eligible for collective citizenship. Griswald de Castillo points out that 
the “Hispanos of  New Mexico [which included the territory of  Arizona until 
1863] did not obtain full political rights of  U.S. citizens until the territory was 
admitted into the union in 1912. Until that time, “essentially these citizens-
in-waiting had their rights guaranteed by treaty,” and not the Constitution 
(Griswald del Castillo 1990, 71). The treaty and the guarantee to provide 
Mexicans with U.S. citizenship did not prevent legal and extralegal action by 
territorial governments to deprive Mexican’s of  their political rights. 
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The Treaty of  Guadalupe Hidalgo also granted certain Indian tribes 
collective U.S. citizenship. The U.S. Department of  Interior confirmed that 
the Puebla Indians of  New Mexico and Arizona became citizens of  the 
United States by virtue of  Article VIII of  the Treaty of  Guadalupe (United 
States Senate 1884, 116). While the “mission” Indians of  California were also 
considered U.S. citizens, the government reported “they have never voted, 
neither do they act as citizens, though that privilege was granted them by the 
treaty of  Guadalupe Hidalgo” (United States. Department of  the Interior 1894, 
212). The Department of  Interior informed Congress that instead of  being 
accorded all the privileges and immunities of  U.S. citizenship, “They have not 
received as much consideration as the wild tribes found in occupation in other 
parts of  the country.” (United States Senate 1884, 116). Congress drew a legal 
distinction between the collectively naturalized Hispanicized Indians and the 
“wild tribes,” but the territorial governments in California, New Mexico and 
Arizona flagrantly ignored this distinction. The federal government did not 
seek to protect the citizenship rights of  Hispanicized Indians. The collective 
naturalization of  Mexicans and Hispanicized Indians did not protect them 
from the wanton violence and systematic campaign of  terror by white settlers 
to deprive them of  their property and human and civil rights. By the time 
the territories were admitted into the union, Mexicans and Indians had been 
effectively disenfranchised, politically marginalized and economically diminished. 
Under the Treaty of  Texas Annexation, “the citizens of  the Republic 
of  Texas” were “incorporated into the Union of  the United States”; this 
would happen “as soon as may be consistent with the principle of  the federal 
constitution to the enjoyment of  all the rights, privileges and immunities of  the 
citizens of  the United States.” The citizens of  the Republic were “all persons 
who were residing in Texas on the day of  the Declaration of  Independence.” 
Tejanos were citizens of  Texas and thus were collectively naturalized. Blacks, 
and descendants of  Blacks and Indians, were not citizens of  the Republic, and 
consequently were not granted U.S. citizenship according to this provision of  
the treaty. Six months after its annexation on December 29, 1845, Texas, which 
had a sizeable white population, was admitted as a slave state into the Union. 
California, another territory Mexico was forced to relinquish to the United 
States, was admitted into the union in 1850, without having been designated 
an incorporated territory. The discovery of  gold in 1850 and the subsequent 
migration of  white fortune seekers, who outnumbered Mexicans and other 
non-whites, helped California meet the minimum population requirement of  
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60,000 free inhabitants. California also met the implicit congressional stipulation 
that territories ceded by Mexico would not be admitted to the union until 
whites constituted the majority of  the population. As was the case in Texas, 
the Mexican and Indian populations were victims of  state-sanctioned terror 
and outrageous legal actions to eradicate them as economic and political actors. 
The organized incorporated territories of  Arizona and New Mexico, 
which were carved out of  the territory Mexico, as well as some additional 
land purchased by the U.S. in 1873 (the Gadsden Purchase), were not granted 
statehood for decades, even though the inhabitants of  these territories were 
collectively naturalized.3 Lawrence Lowell commented that “New Mexico 
remains under territorial government, although her population is already larger 
than is usually required for statehood, a large part of  the inhabitants being 
of  Spanish race, and not sufficiently trained in habits of  self-government” 
(Lowell 1899a, 152). New Mexico joined the union in 1912, six decades after 
the territory was ceded by Mexico. Simeon E. Baldwin, Yale Professor and 
Governor of  Connecticut, expressed his reservations about incorporating 
certain territories into the Union. He wrote: 
No fixed limit of  time can be assigned for the duration of  such a regime. We have held 
New Mexico, under different forms of  administration, for nearly fifty years, and the 
character and traditions and laws of  a Latin race are still so deeply stamped upon her 
people and her institutions’ that no demand of  party exigency has been strong enough 
to secure her admission to the privilege of  statehood. (Baldwin 1899, 406)
 
In 1870 Arizona’s population was composed of  61 percent Mexicans and 
39 percent white. After whites became the majority population, the territory 
of  Arizona was admitted into the Union in 1912. In 1870 only 30 percent of  
Colorado’s population was Mexican, but after attaining a population that was 
majority white, the territory was admitted into the Union in 1876. Apparently, 
once the whites comprised the majority of  the population, Congress judged 
that the territory’s inhabitants were “sufficiently trained in the habits of  self-
government.” It took over three decades for the demographic transition to 
take place in Arizona and New Mexico, resulting in a majority white population 
enabling these organized, incorporated territories to be admitted into the 
union. Significantly less time was needed for Texas, California and Colorado. 
In short, whiteness was equated with competence, while the racialized 
inhabitants were devoid of  the requisite behavioral traits to govern themselves.
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While non-white peoples of  the territories were considered inherently, 
if  irredeemably, inferior to Anglo Americans, nonetheless some were 
collectively naturalized. Clearly some “races” were portrayed as a particularly 
deficient racial stock that posed a greater threat to the preservation of  the 
nation’s pristine white racial homogeneity than other races. Territorial policy 
was devised in the context of  rapidly expanding nation that had eradicated 
indigenous populations, or in the legal parlance of  the times, “uncivilized or 
savage tribes.” They were regarded as hopeless relics of  inferior civilizations 
and as troublesome impediments to modernity. Although non-white people 
inhabited organized incorporated territories, Congress enacted policies that 
economically rewarded white settlers for migrating to these territories. The U.S. 
population was growing rapidly as millions of  Europeans immigrated to the 
young nation. Between 1850, two years after the Treaty of  Guadalupe Hidalgo, 
and 1912, when New Mexico and Arizona were admitted to the union, the 
population of  the United States increased four-fold, from 23,192,000 to 
95, 331,000. Migration from the crowded Atlantic coast to the new frontier 
was inevitable given the unprecedented expansion of  the white population. 
It was simply a matter of  time before these immigrants would numerically 
overwhelm the original inhabitants of  the territories.
Although Supreme Court reaffirmed that Congress could not deny 
inhabitants of  the territories’ so-called fundamental rights, Congress had wide 
latitude to decide the timing and conditions for territories to be admitted to 
the union. A Division of  Insular Affairs report published before the first 
of  the Insular Cases made a conveniently persuasive case that Constitution 
did not apply ex proprio vigore to a territory acquired by conquest and noted 
the distinction between “political privileges and personal rights.” Political 
privileges are created by law, and personal rights are “those inherent to man.” 
The DIA cited a Supreme Court ruling that “it is the spirit of  the constitution, 
the character of  our institutions, and the laws of  humanity and civilization 
that impose restraints” (Magoon 1902, 87). The Court’s decision to legally 
distinguish between laws and rights gave Congress wide birth to decide how it 
would choose to treat the inhabitants of  different territories. Citizenship and 
admission to the union were political rights that Congress could choose to 
withhold or grant to the people of  the territories. The racial composition of  
the territory emerged as a determining factor in deciding when a territory was 
admitted into the union. However, Congress was willing to exempt Hawaii, 
since the haole held unquestioned political and economic control.
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Of  course, Congress did not officially deny a territory admission to the 
Union because its population was not majority white. Rather, as the case of  the 
former Mexican territories show, Congress did not admit them into the union 
until their inhabitants were judged prepared for self-government. When would 
this benchmark be achieved? Actually the presumed capacity of  a population 
for self-government was deduced from the racial composition of  the 
inhabitants of  the territory. The notion that non-Anglo Saxons were incapable 
of  exercising self-government without supervision and training justified 
enslavement, dispossession and subjugation. Kenneth Warren commented 
that in order to discourage and undermine Black political leadership, Southern 
elites orchestrated “an intellectual campaign… to demonstrate the incapacity 
of  blacks for self-government and the corruption that would ensue when the 
unlettered and inexperienced held the reins of  power” (2015, 93). For the 
non-slave holding territories, the whiter the territory’s population became, the 
closer the territory was to achieving territorial status and eventual statehood.
 
Puerto Rico and the Philippines: Exceptional Territories
The Supreme Court’s decision to conjure up the category of  unincorporated 
territory marked a sharp disjuncture in the evolution of  U.S. territorial policy. 
Indeed, it was unprecedented for the federal government to abandon an 
unwritten Constitutional principle that U.S. territorial possessions were assured 
incorporation into the Union. The Supreme Court rulings in the Insular Cases 
effectively empowered Congress to establish and administer overseas colonies. 
The Insular Cases confirmed Congress’s constitutional authority to assert U.S. 
sovereignty over territories ceded by a foreign power without an explicit 
commitment to grant collective naturalization to their inhabitants. 
The notion that the United States could conquer territory through acts 
of  war and exercise absolute sovereignty in perpetuity over its inhabitants, 
and also preclude their admission into the union as full citizens, was anathema 
to sizeable minorities in Congress and the Supreme Court. Ohio Senator 
Augustus Octavius Bacon was one of  a number of  senators who questioned 
the constitutionality of  the proposed Foraker Act. “The avowal is that Puerto 
Rico is not a part of  the United States … but as an entirely separate and 
independent country held by us as a chattel, to be done with by us as we please. 
There has never been any such contention so far as our past history has been 
concerned” (Bacon in Foraker 1900, 34). The influential anti-imperialist lawyer 
Edwin Burnett Smith protested President McKinley’s policy claiming that it 
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offered Puerto Ricans “no hope of  independence, no prospect of  American 
citizenship, no constitutional protection, no representation in the congress 
which taxes” the people of  the possession. He objected that the Foraker Act 
was “the government of  men by arbitrary power without their consent; this is 
imperialism!” (Smith 1900, 30). Yet, unprecedented as the demands for holding 
territories as colonies may have been, a history of  Congressional territorial 
legislation and policies, executive decrees and court rulings, and cold political 
calculations set the context for the federal government’s treatment of  Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines. 
The treaties of  annexation that preceded the Treaty of  Paris extended 
collective naturalization to certain categories of  racialized inhabitants of  
incorporated territories. However, in the cases of  the newly acquired insular 
possessions (Puerto Rico, the Philippines and Guam), the Treaty of  Paris did 
not include citizenship provisions. The Treaty simply noted, “The civil rights 
and political status of  the native inhabitants of  the territories hereby ceded to 
the United States shall be determined by the Congress.” According to Senator 
Foraker, “This provision was insisted upon … because we had then too little 
knowledge of  the people of  the Philippines and not enough of  those in Porto 
Rico to know whether it would be wise or desirable to incorporate them into 
out body politic and extend to the privileges and immunities of  American 
citizenship” (Foraker 1900, 8). 
Congress could not decide whether the Constitution applied equally to Puerto Rico        
and the Philippines.
In this detailed assessment of  congressional debates pursuant to the 
Foraker Act, José Cabranes noted that “the race of  the Puerto Ricans was the 
subject of  some concern, especially to those members of  Congress with anti-
imperialist sympathies, but it was not as overtly significant a factor as in the case 
of  the Filipinos” (Cabranes 1978, 444). Congress could not decide whether 
the Constitution applied equally to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Senator 
Foraker reported that Congress faced a “singular situation.” Consequently, 
the original bill was amended to specify that Puerto Ricans were “citizens of  
Porto Rico,” rather than of  the United States, “because legislating for Porto 
Rico before we legislated for the Philippines” could establish a “precedent 
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that might embarrass us in legislating for the Philippines” (Cabranes 1978, 
445). Representative William E. Williams agreed that “the Administration does 
not care a fig for Puerto Rico,” the Foraker Act is “not for the mere sake of  
deriving revenue for that island, but as a precedent for our future guidance in 
the control of  the Philippines (Torruella 1983, 35–36).
Simeon Baldwin asked that if  the Constitution “is supreme law” over 
the territories, the inhabitants of  the possessions would be protected by 
the 14th and 15th Amendments, which would “certainly prove a source of  
embarrassment” to the United States. The 14th Amendment prohibits denying 
U.S. citizens the right to vote because of  race or color. Federal law declares 
“all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are declared to be citizens of  the United States.” 
Baldwin surmised that the 14th Amendment 
would seem to make every child, of  whatever race, born in any of  our new territorial 
possessions after they become part of  the United States, of  parents who are among 
its inhabitants and subject to our jurisdiction, a citizen of  the United States from the 
moment of  birth. (Baldwin 1899, 406)
Puerto Rico had a population of  953,233 in 1898. According to Lt. Col. 
J.P. Sanger, who compiled demographic data on Puerto Rico, the population 
could be divided into those who are Caucasians and those “who are not 
pure whites.” Whites made up about 62 percent of  the population, and the 
rest of  the population consisted of  “colored” who included “negroes and 
people of  mixed blood.” Sanger reported favorably, “Cuba and Puerto Rico 
are exceptional in the West Indies in having a majority of  whites.” He also 
reported that except for North Carolina, all the coastal states from Virginia to 
Louisiana had a smaller portion of  whites than Puerto Rico (Sanger 1900, 40, 
42). Another military officer described Puerto Rico’s black population with 
the demeaning racist troupes that prevailed in the United States. Major F.W. 
Mansfield described the “the full blooded negro... more or less shiftless and 
lazy. They possess both traits to a degree greater than our Southern negroes” 
(Mansfield 1900, 39). Martin D. Brumbaugh, Puerto Rico’s First Commissioner 
of  Education, reported that three classes of  people inhabited the island. These 
he labeled colored, illiterate whites, and “a small but important group of  
proprietors, merchants, merchants and professional men who had received an 
education of  the most liberal character.” He approvingly noted, “This third 
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group constituted the most hopeful portion of  the population and served as 
a basis upon which to build a new and important civilization” (Lake Mohonk 
Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples 1911, 175).
Congress intensely debated the racial and cultural dissimilarities of  the 
inhabitants of  the newly acquired possessions before the Supreme Court 
issued its ruling in Bidwell v Downes. The Congressional record and academic 
articles reveal Congress’s lengthy and tortured debates on “the civil rights and 
political status” that should be accorded the inhabitants of  the Philippines 
and Puerto Rico. During the debates proceeding the Foraker and Jones Acts, 
Congress was quick to draw disturbingly negative portrayals of  Filipinos and 
Puerto Ricans. Undoubtedly Representative George Hoar’s denunciation, that 
“the blood of  tropical peoples would taint the stream of  American political 
and social life and further complicate the nation’s already festering racial 
problems,” enjoyed the support of  his colleagues (Beisner 1968, 219). But as 
debates progressed legislators openly expressed their preference for treating 
Puerto Rico more liberally than the Philippines. Foraker emphasized that the 
U.S. was “not only acquiring Porto Rico with Porto Ricans, … but also the 
Philippines, with eight or ten million people.” Foraker worried that “we did not 
know very much,” about the Filipinos and “whether they would make good 
citizens of  the United States” (quoted in Belmont 1910, 10). 
He and others questioned the wisdom of  incorporating the Philippines 
into the Union as part of  the territory of  the United States (see Belmont 1900). 
However, influential academic and political figures, including Simeon, argued 
that the “Islands that fringe a continent are part of  it. Puerto Rico and Cuba 
are American islands” (Baldwin 1899, 406). Judge H.C. McDougal’s pamphlet 
published in 1900 by the Union Veteran Patriotic League, expressed a popular 
view: “No one who knows both races will assert that the Filipino masses 
are higher in the scale of  civilization, or better fitted for self-government or 
citizenship than are our American Indians or Southern negroes” (McDougal 
1900, 21). While the non-white inhabitants of  the insular possessions were 
apparently anathema to Congress, the racism legislators displayed was 
differentiated and contingent. Although both Puerto Ricans and Filipinos were 
judged to be inferior to the Anglo-Americans, racial disdain and animus was far 
more pronounced toward the Filipinos than it was toward Puerto Ricans. In 
the debates pursuant to the organic acts of  1900 and the Jones Act of  1917, 
the divergent racial views were in full display in Congress. Filipinos, Chinese, 
Blacks and Indians were racially constructed as inherently, if  not irredeemably 
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inferior to Anglo Americans. In contrast, Andrew Carnegie, the wealthy 
anti-imperialist, called for Puerto Rico’s annexation since it had a large white 
population, and he was convinced that its people would become “American 
in every sense,” instead of  “foreign races bound in time to be false to the 
Republic in order to be true to themselves” (quoted in Cabán 1999, 199). 
In a speech at the 1901 Conference of  the American Academy of  Political 
and Social Science, Lawrence Lowell drew a marked distinction between 
the Philippines and Puerto Rico. According to Lowell, “the two problems 
[ruling Puerto Rico and the Philippines] are quite distinct, and each presents 
its peculiar difficulties. One is that of  a subtropical island whose inhabitants, 
although foreigners are largely of  European blood. The other is that of  a 
tropical country, peopled almost entirely by Asiatics” (Lowell 1899b, 47). 
I can’t help but comment on the characteristic Anglo-American arrogance 
displayed by Lowell reporting that Puerto Ricans were foreigners. Yet this was 
indeed the imperial attitude: once a territory was annexed into the empire its 
inhabitants were reclassified as foreign subjects. 
By 1917, Congressional antipathy toward Puerto Ricans as an inferior race abated 
substantially, although as I will discuss below, they continue to be characterized as 
experientially and temperamentally unsuited for self-government.
Cabranes’ neatly described the 1916 racially tinged citizenship debates 
in Congress, as well as Supreme Court rulings, that reaffirmed contrasting 
perceptions of  the inhabitants of  the insular possessions and the rationale 
for the selective application of  the Constitution. House majority leader Payne 
and others wanted “to treat Puerto Rico somewhat differently from the 
Philippines by offering the prospect of  political integration with the United 
States without establishing a precedent for dealing with the Philippines.” 
Progressive Republican George Huddleston of  Alabama observed “entirely 
different conditions obtain in Porto Rico than those which obtain in the 
Philippines.” He continued, “The people of  Porto Rico are of  our race, 
they are people who inherit an old civilization—a civilization which may 
be fairly compared to our own” (quoted in Cabranes 1978, 474). By 1917, 
Congressional antipathy toward Puerto Ricans as an inferior race abated 
substantially, although as I will discuss below, they continue to be characterized 
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as experientially and temperamentally unsuited for self-government. 
Incapacity for Self-Government Recoding Racism
Secretary of  War Elihu Root, arguably the most influential U.S. colonial official, 
was adamantly opposed to granting Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship and self-
governance. Root believed that Puerto Ricans could not be “fully entrusted 
with self-government, they must first learn the lesson of  self-control and 
respect for the principles of  constitutional government.” Presenting Puerto 
Ricans with a written constitution would be useless, given their “character 
and acquired habits of  thought and feeling.” Puerto Ricans would fail at self-
government “without a course of  tuition under a strong and guiding hand.” 
He was convinced that the Puerto Ricans, as a people, “have not yet been 
educated in the art of  self-government,” and lacked “any real understanding 
of  the way to conduct a popular government,” and “have never learned the 
fundamental and essential lesson of  obedience to the decision of  the majority” 
(Root 1899, 26). Phillip Jessup, Root’s biographer, wrote that the Secretary of  
War “was opposed to the ‘stupid chuckle headed performance on the part of  
Congress in granting citizenship to Porto Ricans.” Root believed that Puerto 
Rico’s “people cannot really be citizens of  the United States, and calling them 
so only defeats the real liberty Porto Ricans should have” (Jessup 1938, 378). 
Root’s racist conceptions that Puerto Ricans were infantile, unruly and 
undisciplined was palpable and probably more pronounced than the expressed 
views of  other senior officials. Despite his apparent disdain for the political 
incapacities of  Puerto Ricans, Root adopted the all too familiar benign and 
paternalistic explanation that Puerto Rico “came to us not only by legal right, 
but with the cheerful and unanimous desire of  its people, who are peaceful and 
loyal and eager for the benefits to be derived from the application of  American 
ideas of  government” (Root 1899, 26). Given his unquestioned authority over 
colonial matters, Root affected the outcome of  legislative deliberations on 
Puerto Rico’s status. His reports and letters on Puerto Rico’s territorial status 
influenced the Supreme Court as well. Downes v Bidwell reflects the bias toward 
Puerto Ricans as dependent people in need of  guidance by the superior Anglo-
Americans. The court ruled that if  the possessions “are inhabited by alien 
races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of  taxation, and 
modes of  thought, the administration of  government and justice, according to 
Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible” (Downes v. Bidwell 1901, 
286). The court concluded that the Constitution does not forbid Congress 
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from employing its powers to have “the blessings of  a free government under 
the Constitution extended to them.”
Alleyne Ireland, a British journalist and an acknowledged expert on British 
colonial policy, observed about Puerto Rico: 
The island has been for centuries under the rule of  a nation whose political ideas 
and methods are fundamentally different from those of  the American people. Instead 
of  a native population used to American ways, familiar with American institutions, 
dependent on American capital, there is here a people with a very large admixture of  
Spanish blood, strongly affected both by custom and heredity toward Spanish methods, 
speaking the Spanish language, and with all the profound conservatism which, as far as 
manners and customs are concerned, so distinctively belongs to the Spanish peasantry. 
(Ireland 1899, 217)
Root relied on reports from military officers stationed on the island, 
congressional delegations and journalists and articles by prominent lawyers 
and professors to form his opinions about the capacities of  Puerto Ricans 
for self-rule. Major Mansfield reported: “When civil government comes, as it 
must soon, great care must be taken that competent Americans are put into 
office…. If  natives are put in complete control now the island will soon be 
worse than it was under the Spaniards” (Mansfield 1900, 39). Captain Palmer 
Pierce, who was stationed in Puerto Rico, concluded that “it is seen that 
Porto Ricans are unfit for administering self-government. They have never 
had experience, having for centuries been subjected to a power that extracted 
unquestioning compliance and submission” (Pierce 1911, 77). Representative 
James O’Grady echoed this sentiment when he told his colleagues that Puerto 
Ricans had “no preparation for American government. For four hundred years 
it has been Spanish, and it is to-day Spanish in customs, in manners, in morals 
and in ideals. If  it is ever to be truly American, all of  these conditions must be 
completely changed and many of  them absolutely eradicated” (O’Grady 1900, 
8). Paul Charlton, who served for ten years as legal council for the Bureau of  
Insular Affairs of  the War Department and as a federal district judge in Puerto 
Rico, commented: “Repeated effort has been made by the Porto Ricans to 
obtain collective naturalization as citizens of  the United States, but the congress, in 
its wise judgment, has been unwilling to extend this privilege until the people 
by their local conduct of  affairs have shown themselves, both deserving and 
capable of  its exercise” (Charlton 1907, 111).
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Lowell argued against territorial incorporation, stating that statehood for Puerto Rico 
would need to be delayed until Puerto Ricans had “been trained in self-government, and 
has acquired the political, social and industrial habits that prevail in the United States.”
The prolific Lawrence Lowell called for an extended period of  tutelage for 
the Puerto Ricans. He wrote that Puerto Rico was “almost as densely peopled 
to-day as any part of  the United States, and yet it must be clear that it cannot 
be admitted as a state until it has been trained in self-government, and has 
acquired the political, social and industrial habits that prevail in the United 
States” (Lowell 1899b, 47). Lowell argued against territorial incorporation, 
stating that statehood for Puerto Rico would need to be delayed until Puerto 
Ricans had “been trained in self-government, and has acquired the political, 
social and industrial habits that prevail in the United States.” He expected “that 
this will take a very great length of  time… so long that statehood is too remote 
to be taken into consideration in determining the immediate administration of  
the island” (Lowell 1899c, 11). 
Puerto Ricans challenged U.S. officials who so easily disparaged them as 
incapable of  self-government. Puerto Rico’s Resident Commissioner Tulio 
Larrínaga instructed his congressional colleagues:
A good deal has been said about the unpreparedness and the unfitness of  our people 
for self-government. I wish every honest man to answer me this question: If  every 
Territory and every State that has been admitted into this Union was better prepared 
than the island of  Porto Rico is today? Look back to the different portions of  this 
country which have been made States by acts of  Congress. What was their population; 
what was their literacy; what was their wealth; what was their civilization as compared 
with the civilization of  four hundred years of  Porto Rico? (U.S. House 1910)
At the 1911 Mohonk Conference Luis Muñoz Rivera delivered a dramatic 
denunciation of  the colonial regime. In a statement dripping with irony and 
wit, Muñoz Rivera rejected the notion that Puerto Ricans were incapable of  
self-government. He told his hosts the following:
Civilization began its work in Porto Rico long before it manifested itself  in the United 
States. Our life as an organized society dates back over found hundred years. Yet the 
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contention is made that, on account of  our presumed incapacity, we are not entitled 
to the liberal autonomy, which is your happiness to enjoy, or to exercise of  the self-
government practiced by yourselves. (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and 
Other Dependent Peoples 1911, 187)
Unlike large numbers of  Mexicans who were dispossessed and displaced 
from their lands by white settlers, no such forced conversation would occur in 
Puerto Rico. Since Puerto Rico was densely populated, the federal government 
gave little thought to promoting white settlements in the island. It was futile 
to enact federal legislation comparable to the Homestead Acts, which aimed 
to encourage migration of  whites to the western territories. In short, the 
population of  Puerto Rico could not be displaced or supplanted, but neither 
would it be incorporated into the body politic. Not surprisingly, U.S. colonial 
officials were concerned that because of  the island’s physical separation from 
the United States that Puerto Ricans would resist acculturation and perpetuate 
their distinctive cultural, religious and linguistic practices. U.S. officials realized 
that as long as Puerto Ricans preserved their national identity, they would 
impede the dissemination of  Anglo-American values and institutions, and the 
conversion of  Puerto Ricans into loyal colonial wards. Puerto Rican national 
identity would have to be reconstituted so as not to undermine effective colonial 
rule. Army generals, who effectively functioned as military dictators until the 
establishment of  a civilian government, launched a systematic campaign to 
“Americanize” Puerto Ricans, and to make them proficient in the English 
language (Cabán 2001, 2002; Guerra 1998). Colonial officials were committed 
to converting Puerto Ricans into a bicultural, bilingual colonial subject who 
could advance U.S. imperialist aspirations in the Southern Hemisphere and the 
Caribbean (see Cabán 1999, 2002).
Not Anglo-Saxons, nor Savages Either. Puerto Ricans can be Trained!
Anglo-America asserted as gospel the inherent inferiority of  the inhabitants 
of  the insular possessions, a view that seemingly doomed Puerto Ricans from 
obtaining collective U.S. citizenship. Yet Senator Foraker had proposed U.S. 
citizenship for Puerto Ricans, although the Committee on Insular Affairs 
withdrew the provision “apparently under the impression’ that such provision 
would affect the constitutionality of  the act in respect to certain revenue 
provisions contained” in the bill (Capó-Rodríguez 1919b, 555). Respected 
academicians published influential commentaries that laid out a rationale for 
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treating Puerto Rico differently than the Philippines. The ubiquitous Lowell 
saw a “vital difference between Porto Rico and the Philippines. Civilization in 
Porto Rico, as in the United States, is essentially European, and hence our aim 
must be to develop the people in the lines of  our own life.” He thought “every 
consideration of  their welfare” should persuade the U.S. to bring Puerto 
Ricans “into accord with our political, social and economic standards” (Lowell 
1899c, 11). Rogers Smith exposed the racist strains in the seeming beneficent 
Lowell, and demonstrated that in fact his views represented “a retreat from 
racial equal protection” (Smith 2001, 377). In the popular Atlantic Monthly 
article referenced by Smith, Lowell observes: 
No one of  them (the possessions) has a population homogeneous with our own, or the 
experience of  a long training in self-government. Every unprejudiced observer must 
recognize that to let the Filipinos rule themselves would be sheer cruelty both to them 
and to the white men at Manila. Even in case of  the people of  Porto Rico, who stand 
on an entirely different footing, self-government must be gradual and tentative if  it is to 
be a success. They must be trained for it, as our forefathers were trained. (1899a, 152)
Puerto Ricans and Mexicans were racialized as culturally deficient relative 
to Anglo-Saxons. While Puerto Ricans and Mexican were clearly racialized, 
they were portrayed as victims of  a deficient Spanish culture, which ultimately 
had to be expunged if  they were to be full members of  the American polity. 
Racial aversion as conveyed in U.S. government practice and policy toward 
Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, seemed less noxious than what Filipinos, 
Indians, Chinese and Blacks were forced to endure. The racial formulation 
of  Mexicans and Puerto Ricans as the deficient progeny of  monarchical, 
Catholic Spain was a convenient notion to justify U.S. tutelage. Baldwin’s view 
on this subject is instructive: “We have held New Mexico, under different 
forms of  administration, for nearly fifty years, and the character and traditions 
and laws of  a Latin race are still so deeply stamped upon her people and her 
institutions” that her “admission to the privilege of  statehood” could not be 
secured (Baldwin 1899, 415).
As I discussed above, concerns about the capacity for self-government in 
the incorporated territories where Mexicans predominated, evaporated once 
whites comprised the majority of  the population (the cases of  Colorado, 
New Mexico and Arizona). In contrast, for the unincorporated territories 
Congress barred Filipinos from ever obtaining U.S. citizenship, and for 
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nearly two decades failed to grant Puerto Ricans U.S. citizenship. According 
to colonial officials, Puerto Ricans were simply unprepared for self-rule 
given their presumed inherent cultural attributes and ignorance of  Anglo-
Saxon republican institutions and modes of  Spanish political culture. These 
pronouncements on the cultural deficiencies and behavioral predisposition of  
the former Spanish subjects set the context for Americanization programs that 
were enacted in both Puerto Rico and New Mexico. The federal government 
employed euphemisms to obscure its racist motivations in order to delay 
admission of  New Mexico and Arizona territories into the union, and to 
deny Puerto Rico the status of  incorporated territory. U.S. empire builders 
employed two racially coded rationales to exclude these territories: their 
inhabitants were either intellectually incapable of  comprehending the genius 
of  republican institutions, or they lacked the requisite temperament for and 
experience in self-government. In reality, no amount of  tutelage would ever 
be sufficient to convince the federal government to admit into the union 
territories in which non-whites were the majority. Mexicans and Puerto Ricans 
were portrayed as deficient in those unique Anglo-American attributes that 
were deemed as indispensable for efficient self-government. Their exclusion 
was predicated on their non-whiteness; by the late-1890s, whiteness was 
virtually synonymous with Anglo-Americanness (see Roediger 1991, 143; 
Horsman 1981). Territories that were either ethnically cleansed of  their non-
white inhabitants or whose inhabitants had been denuded of  their economic 
and political rights, would quickly gain admission to the union once they were 
repopulated by white settlers, merchants and related interlopers. 
By asserting that Puerto Ricans were infantile, emotionally volatile and woefully    
ignorant, U.S. officials created a convenient rationale to deny Puerto Rican control       
over their own country.
U.S. empire builders believed that Puerto Ricans were not only shackled by 
archaic Catholic values and anti-modern cultural impulses, but were also guilty 
of  dysfunctional political behavior and suffered from excessively high illiteracy 
rates. By asserting that Puerto Ricans were infantile, emotionally volatile 
and woefully ignorant, U.S. officials created a convenient rationale to deny 
Puerto Rican control over their own country. In reality, the issue was never 
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about an innate Puerto Rican incapacity for self-government. The U.S. would 
never relinquish control over the reigns of  colonial administration to Puerto 
Ricans until they had embraced the legitimacy of  their colonial subordination, 
demonstrated patriotic loyalty, and cleansed themselves of  Spanish cultural 
and social traits. For Americans, the preservation of  cultural and linguistic 
difference was always perceived as a refusal to assimilate and embrace the 
exceptionalism of  the new nation. Ellwood P. Cubberly, the influential Dean 
of  Education at Stanford University, detested Latin American immigrants, 
who he claimed “were of  a very different type from the North and West 
Europeans who preceded them,” and that they had afflicted the United States 
“with a serious case of  racial indigestion.” He debased the immigrants as 
“largely illiterate, docile, lacking in initiative, and almost wholly without the 
Anglo-Saxon conceptions of  righteousness, liberty, law, order, public decency 
and government.” As a result, he wrote that “their coming has served to dilute 
tremendously our national stock and to weaken and corrupt our political life.” 
Cubberly demanded that the immigrants be inculcated with “our conception 
of  law and order and government, and come to act in harmony with the spirit 
and purpose of  our American national ideal” (Cubberley 1918, 26, 30). Clearly, 
the difference was that U.S. officials were convinced that, unlike Puerto Ricans, 
white European immigrants would divest themselves of  their old-world 
culture and languages, and rapidly assimilate into the mainstream. Racialized 
people, either residing on the mainland or colonial lands, were portrayed as 
inherently incapable of  fully assimilating. 
 Congress never reported how it would decide when Puerto Ricans had 
attained the requisite capacity for self-government. In fact, Congress never 
officially linked an enhanced capacity for self-government with granting 
Puerto Ricans self-government. Nor did Congress state that once Puerto 
Ricans proved adept at self-government that the island would be incorporated 
as a territory of  the Union. It is interesting to point out that in the case of  
Puerto Rico citizenship, territorial status and capacity for self-government did 
not coalesce into a logic that clarified Puerto Rico’s future in the union. This 
treatment contrasts with the experience of  territories populated by majority 
white inhabitants. In these cases Congress conferred collective U.S. citizenship, 
territorial incorporation and legal recognition of  the inhabitants’ capacity for 
self-government, and the territories were admitted into the union as states with 
minimal delays. 
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U.S. colonial policy in Puerto Rico, which operated with the appearance 
of  developing effective and rational territorial administration, was actually 
designed to undermine the autonomous political and economic power of  
domestic elites. These political and economic actors could impede the effective 
colonial administration and the Americanization of  Puerto Rico. Consequently, 
Puerto Ricans were included in the colonial administration, but excluded from 
any meaningful role in policymaking. U.S. officials portrayed resistance to 
colonialism as proof  that Puerto Ricans had simply failed to comprehend the 
genius of  republican institutions, and lacked the patience to properly learn 
how to administer a government. U.S. officials could not conceive that Puerto 
Rican opposition to colonial policy was justified. When Puerto Ricans were 
most successful in blocking the excesses of  corrupt colonial rule, they were 
portrayed as uncontrollably obstreperous and unfit to for self-government. 
The so-called policy of  educating the Puerto Ricans in self-government was 
a program to train a cadre of  administrators loyal to the U.S., who would 
effectively manage the colonial administration under the direct supervision 
of  a governor appointed by the President. Not until 1947 were Puerto Ricans 
permitted to select their governor and exercise a measure of  control over the 
colonial administration. 
Root was a proponent of  a robust and comprehensive Americanization 
program that he hoped would convert Puerto Ricans into compliant colonial 
wards. In the absence of  such a campaign, which included English language 
instruction, the people of  Puerto Rico would remain “alien and foreign” to the 
U.S. and impede the effectiveness of  U.S. colonial rule. Moreover, the existing 
class structure and a diversified agricultural economy under Puerto Rican 
ownership also posed an impediment to the expansion of  capitalist production 
relations under U.S. corporate control, which was a prime task for the colonial 
administration. Unlike Hawaii at the time of  its annexation, Puerto Rico’s 
land-owning class retained a dominant position in the economy when the U.S. 
acquired the country. Colonial officials realized that continued Puerto Rican 
control of  the insular economy would impede American corporations from 
gaining control of  the profitable sugar and tobacco industries. Root oversaw 
the monetary, fiscal and legal transformation of  Puerto Rico that facilitated 
the rapid expansion of  U.S. sugar monopolies. The transition to a monocrop 
economy overwhelmingly in control of  oligopolistic sugar corporations was 
well under way when U.S. citizenship was conferred on Puerto Rico in 1917 
(Ayala 2007). The grant of  citizenship, however, did not provide Puerto Ricans 
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with legal means to resist the colonial state’s role in promoting the relentless 
appropriation of  their country’s land and natural resources by American 
capital. Nor did citizenship diminish in the slightest Congress’s absolute power 
over Puerto Rico. In this sense, collective naturalization for Puerto Ricans 
was as inconsequential in advancing their collective economic and political 
interests, as it was for the hapless Mexicans who were also victims of  empire. 
The collective naturalization of  “nationals” through statute, rather than 
through the provisions of  the U.S. constitution, was unprecedented. Moreover, 
the citizenship conferred on Puerto Ricans was revocable, and ultimately 
contingent on the will of  Congress to preserve it. This was a radical departure 
from the non-revocable citizenship conferred on other non-Anglo Saxon 
subjects, such as the Hawaiians and Mexicans. In his rigorous analysis of  the 
Jones Act citizenship, Edgardo Meléndez argues that Congress constructed a 
historically unprecedented type of  citizenship that applied only to the Puerto 
Rican colonial subject. According to Meléndez, the Supreme Court decided 
that “the colonial nature of  the territory was sufficient to merit the exclusion 
of  these new citizens from full membership in the American polity” (Meléndez 
2013, 108). This “colonial citizenship,” in addition to being revocable, limited 
the legal rights and protections accorded to 14th amendment citizens and 
converted the Puerto Rican subject into a “migrant subject” (2013, 108). 
Unrestricted Puerto Rican migration to the United States was pivotal to the 
success of  Operation Bootstrap in the 1950s (see History Task Force 1979).4 
Ultimately, the citizenship accorded Puerto Ricans was contingent and variable 
and not defined exclusively by ascriptive factors. 
 The conferral of  a historically unprecedented collective naturalization on 
Puerto Rico (citizenship without territorial incorporation) was motivated by 
various factors (Baldoz and Ayala 2013, 83–84; Rivera Ramos 2001, 47–54). 
Collective naturalization was conferred during a period in which Puerto Rico’s 
political leadership was increasingly critical of  colonial rule, and claimed a 
growing affinity for independence. Puerto Ricans were demanding increased 
autonomy ever since the period of  military rule, but Congress had chosen not 
to act. On the eve of  U.S. entry into World War II, Puerto Rican independence 
activism became a national security objective. Rexford Tugwell, who served as 
Puerto Rico’s last appointed governor, wrote in his memoirs that citizenship 
was granted “in a sudden realization of  strategic possibilities, not as part of  
policy, and significantly enough in time of  war when Puerto Rican loyalty 
was important” (Tugwell 1977, 70). The grant of  citizenship was expected 
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to mollify the dissident voices. According to the War Department, the failure 
to confer citizenship had provoked growing Puerto Rican discontent, and 
recommended “that Puerto Ricans should be admitted to citizenship… to 
remove the cause of  political unrest (quoted in Cabán 1999, 199). In fact, by 
1912 the Puerto Rican political leadership had grown increasingly skeptical and 
disillusioned with U.S. colonial rule and resisted the imposition of  citizenship 
without significant political reforms (see Rivera Ramos 2001, 153–55; Venator-
Santiago 2013, 93–94). 
Citizenship would dispel any illusions Puerto Ricans entertained about achieving 
independence since Congress would never allow U.S. citizens to secede from the         
United States.
The grant of  citizenship demonstrated Congress’s intention to impress 
upon Puerto Ricans that statehood was not in their future, and that their 
country would be held as a colony in perpetuity if  need be. Citizenship would 
dispel any illusions Puerto Ricans entertained about achieving independence 
since Congress would never allow U.S. citizens to secede from the United 
States. Armed with Supreme Court rulings, Congress was given the legal power 
to impose collective citizenship without altering Puerto Rico’s unincorporated 
territorial status. Citizenship did not provide Puerto Ricans with constitutionally 
based claims for statehood. This was a pivotal moment in the construction 
of  Puerto Rican colonialism, because the imposition of  citizenship on the 
inhabitants of  an unincorporated territorial possession resolved a vexing 
problem for Congress. Members of  Congress argued that if  Puerto Rico 
were to be granting territorial status, the U.S. would be compelled to enact 
the same type of  collective naturalization it had for Hawaii, the Republic of  
Texas and territories ceded or purchased by the U.S. Territorial incorporation 
would inevitably result in statehood, although the process could be delayed for 
decades, as was the case for New Mexico and Arizona. But in these instances 
delay was designed to provide more time for whites to populate the territory 
and gain political control of  the territories. Clearly this would not be the case 
for densely populated Puerto Rico. Policymakers in Washington were certain 
that the Puerto Rican population would continue to grow, since it would be 
impossible to displace it through forced migration. Statehood would be the 
275Puerto Ricans as Contingent Citizens • Pedro Cabán
inevitable consequence of  incorporating Puerto Rico as a territory. Puerto 
Ricans would attain voting representation in Congress, cast electoral votes in 
presidential elections, be included in the Electoral College and gain the full 
panoply of  constitutional rights they were previously denied. 
Fears about the impact on national policy-making if  the “Spanish 
American islands” were annexed were expressed by Carl Schurz, a leading 
figure in the anti-imperialist league:
There would then be a large lot of  Spanish-Americans in the Senate and in the House 
and among the presidential electors—more than enough of  them to hold, occasionally 
at least, the balance of  power in making laws not only for themselves, but for the 
whole American people, and in giving the republic its Presidents. There would be 
“the Spanish- American vote”—being occasionally the decisive vote—to be bargained 
with. But since the United States would not relinquish the territories and liberate its 
inhabitants, colonial policy emphasized the idea of  Americanizing the inhabitants 
of  these foreign islands. … It is useless to hope that this population would gradually 
assimilate itself  to the American people as they now are. (Schurz 1898, 782)
 Before the first of  the Insular Cases had been decided Elihu Root warned 
that the United States should not “dilute our electorate by incorporating 
Puerto Rico.” He argued: “If  we give citizenship to the Porto Ricans the 
next step inevitably would be to demand for statehood with the same kind 
of  pressure which New Mexico and Arizona are now exerting.” He exhorted 
Congress to “resist the claim of  citizenship on the part of  a people who differ 
so widely from the people of  the United States” (Jessup 1938, 78). Indeed, 
Root’s protestations could have been one of  the contributing factors for 
Senator Foraker to withdraw the citizenship provision in the original draft of  
the Organic Act. His decision to expunge U.S. citizenship was “prompted by 
the suggestion that the grant of  American citizenship would have the effect 
of  making Puerto Rico an incorporated territory rather than a dependency 
of  possession.” The citizenship provision could have given Puerto Ricans 
the idea that their island nation would be incorporated into the Union, “thus 
putting it in a state of  pupilage for statehood” (Cabranes 1978, 166). Foraker 
uttered these words while the political status of  the Philippines and its people 
remained unresolved. 
In 1917 Senator Jones expressed the same concerns about altering Puerto 
Rico’s territorial status. Senator Jones warned: “If  Porto Rico were admitted to 
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statehood there would be two senators and at least half  a dozen Porto Rican 
representatives; and the fear exists that they might exercise a decisive influence 
in the United States Congress and practically enact laws for the government 
of  the United States. For this reason I believe there is no opinion favorable 
in the United States” (quoted Cabán 1999, 201). The Foraker and Jones Acts 
essentially gerrymandered Puerto Rico out of  national elections. This was 
not done to favor the electoral prospects of  one party over another. Instead 
Congress agreed to deny Puerto Ricans, who had a contradictory identity of  
being both citizens and foreign, any role in the conduct of  the nation’s affairs. 
Underlying the two organic acts was the perception among U.S. officials that 
Puerto Ricans, despite their predominant European genes, were distinctly 
foreign. And consequently, they could not be trusted to administer a colony 
of  significant economic and strategic importance to the emerging empire. 
Intensive Americanization could make them more cooperative colonial wards, 
but Americanization was never intended to be a path to equality.
Conclusion
The U.S. citizenship imposed on Puerto Ricans in 1917 was contingent, 
historically unprecedented and created, as Rivera Ramos has noted, a new 
political subject (2001, 145). Issues of  nationality, citizenship and race have 
been intertwined for Puerto Ricans in shifting arrays of  meanings, made 
more complex as a consequence of  U.S. colonial rule. Puerto Rican meanings 
of  nationality, race and citizenship are simultaneously imposed by a foreign 
power, but also domestically formed through the language, customs and 
norms they nurtured in their island nation. Puerto Ricans are colonial subjects 
who either reside in a territory that is metaphorically a foreign territorial 
possession or they are designated as a racialized minority when residing in 
the United States. They either live as colonial subjects in one space in which 
they are denied self-determination or live as a racial minority in an alternate 
space and with limited political and social equality, and often economically 
marginalized. Puerto Ricans occupy a liminal political space, perpetually 
anticipating the realization of  full equality and perpetually frustrated by their 
unchanging subordinate status. 
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Puerto Ricans celebrate their national pride when one of  their own is appointed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, while comfortably accepting the irony that such an achievement ought not 
to be an extraordinary event.
The imposition of  U.S. citizenship is directly implicated in the exportation 
of  Puerto Rican labor to Hawaii and Arizona over a century ago and in 
the current exodus of  Puerto Ricans from their economically devastated 
island nation. The Puerto Ricans who were born in the United States or 
migrated there are the legacy of  a colonial citizenship that accelerated and 
institutionalized population displacement. Puerto Ricans celebrate their 
national pride when one of  their own is appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
while comfortably accepting the irony that such an achievement ought not 
to be an extraordinary event. After all, Puerto Ricans have been “American 
citizens” for almost a century. Even more ironic is the celebration of  the 
appointment of  one of  their own to the very judicial institution that approved 
a defective and subordinate citizenship. 
But it is precisely the peculiar citizenship that Puerto Ricans have been 
assigned that has proven to be so problematic. The insular cases made it 
abundantly clear that the “otherness of  Puerto Ricans” precluded Congress 
from granting them citizenship with full political rights. Having determined 
that the Constitution did not follow the flag, Puerto Ricans were not 
guaranteed 14th amendment citizenship. But the otherness of  Puerto Ricans 
took different forms. Puerto Ricans were perceived as an alien race genetically 
incapable of  ever genuinely acquiring superior Anglo Saxon qualities, and 
forever to be excluded from the national polity. However, Puerto Ricans, 
unlike Filipinos, Indians and Blacks, were portrayed as a lesser threat to the 
purity of  a self-described white nation. Alternatively, the Puerto Ricans were 
portrayed as a racially mixed but predominately white population whose 
major fault was that unfortunately they were imbued with deficient customs 
and beliefs after centuries of  Spanish rule. The thinking on the eve of  the 
twentieth century was that Puerto Ricans could be redeemed; yet never 
attain the greatness of  the Anglo-Saxon “race.” Because of  their European 
genealogy, Puerto Ricans were not perceived as menacing or genetically 
substandard as other racialized populations, although some portrayed Puerto 
Ricans as slightly tarnished by miscegenation. 
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Notwithstanding their distinctive citizenship and colonial subordination, 
Puerto Ricans are currently depicted as members of  an amorphous Latino/a 
or Hispanic population. The 2016 Republican presidential campaign has 
resurrected a racist denunciation of  Mexicans, and all Latinos, as posing an 
existential threat to the greatness of  Anglo America. It appears that Puerto 
Ricans have been returned to the demeaning status they were given a century 
ago, and stand in the way of  making American great again.
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NOTES
1  Attendant Cruelties, is the title of  Patrice Higonnet’s book on U.S. nationalism and nation 
building. The inspiration for the title was a rarely cited statement by Theodore Roosevelt that 
Higonnet uses as the epigram for her fine study. 
2  Prerea notes a crucial distinction between the draft language of  the treaty and the version 
approved by the Senate, which replaced the term “as soon as possible,” with “in the proper 
time.” Former treaty language for Louisiana and Florida referred to “as soon as possible” 
(Perea 2001, 148)
3  Arizona was granted statehood on February 14, 1912. It was relatively underpopulated until 
1910 with a population of  only 204,300. Mexicans still constituted a large percentage of  the 
population, but not a majority. In 1900 Mexicans comprised 60 percent of  the population, and 
whites only made up 23 percent of  Arizona’s population (<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/06/10/for-three-states-share-of-hispanic-population-returns-to-the-past/>).
4  The following comment is from 1940 government report that focused on overpopulation 
as an impediment to development in Puerto Rico. “While apparently the place most attractive 
to Puerto Rican migrants is the continental United States, Puerto Ricans in general are not 
sufficiently adaptable to the continental life to make a happy and permanent adjustment” 
(Zimmerman 1940, 24). The presumed incapacity of  Puerto Ricans to adapt to modernity is a 
stereotype deeply embedded in official portrayals of  the Puerto Rican people. 
280 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXIX • NUMBER I • 2017
REFERENCES 
American Academy of  Political and Social Science. 1901. America’s race problems: addresses 
at the annual meeting of  the American Academy of  Political and Social Science, 
Philadelphia, 12–13 April. 
Ayala, César J. and Rafael Bernabe. 2007. Puerto Rico in the American Century. Chapel Hill: 
University of  North Carolina Press.
Baldoz, Rick and César Ayala. 2013. The Bordering of  America: Colonialism and Citizenship 
in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. CENTRO: Journal of  the Center for Puerto Rican 
Studies 25(1), 76–105.
Baldwin, Simeon E. 1899. The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and 
Government by the United States of  Island Territory. Harvard Law Review 12(6), 
393–416.
Beisner, Robert L.1968. Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-imperialists, 1898–1900. New York: 
McGraw Hill.
Belmont, Perry. 1900. Republic or Empire: New York Democratic State Committee.
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 1997. Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpretation. American 
Sociological Review 62(3), 465–80.
Burnett, Christina Duffy and Burke Marshall, eds. 2001. Foreign in a Domestic Sense. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press. 
Cabán, Pedro 1999. Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898–1932. 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
———. 2001. Subjects and Immigrants in the Progressive Age. Discourse 23(3), 24–51.
———. 2002. The Colonizing Mission of  the U.S. in Puerto Rico. In Transnational Latino/a 
Communities: Re-examining Politics, Processes and Culture, eds. Anna Sampaio, Carlos 
Vé lez-Ibañ ez and Manolo Gonzá lez-Estay. 115–45. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefeld. 
Cabranes, José A. 1978. Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative 
History of  the United States Citizenship of  Puerto Ricans. University of  Pennsylvania 
Law Review 127(2), 391–492.
Capó-Rodríguez, Pedro. 1919a. The Relations between the United States and Porto Rico: 
Juridical Aspects. American Journal of  International Law 13(3), 483–525.
———. 1919b. Some Historical and Political Aspects of  the Government of  Porto Rico. 
Hispanic American Historical Review 2 (4), 543–85.
Charlton, Paul. 1907. Naturalization and Citizenship in the Insular Possessions of  the United 
States. Annals of  the American Academy of  Political and Social Science 30, 104–14.
Coudert Jr., Frederic R. 1903. Our New Peoples: Citizens, Subjects, Nationals or Aliens. 
Columbia Law Review 3(1), 13–32.
281Puerto Ricans as Contingent Citizens • Pedro Cabán
Cubberley, Ellwood P. 1918. Public Education in the United States. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company.
Dall, William Healey. 1870. Alaska and Its Resource [Electronic source]. Vol. Alaska and its 
resources by William H. Dall. 1845–1927: S. Low, Son and Marston.
Democratic National Convention. 1900. Official Proceedings of  the Proceedings. Chicago. 
Downes v Bidwell. 1901. 182 U.S. 244. 
Foraker, Joseph Benson. 1900. Speech. In Porto Rico : Speech of  Hon. J. B. Foraker, of  Ohio, in the 
Senate of  the United States, Thursday, March 8, 1900. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Senate.
———. 1916. Notes of  a Busy Life. Vol. 1. Cincinnati: Stewart & Kidd Company.
Gettys, Luella. 1934. The Law of  Citizenship in the United States. Chicago: University of  Chicago 
Press.
Governor of  Alaska. 1900. Annual report of  the Governor of  Alaska to the Secretary of  the 
Interior. edited by Department of  the Interior.
Griswald del Castillo. 1990. The Treaty of  Guadalupe Hidalgo: A Legacy of  Conflict. Norman: 
University of  Oklahoma Press.
Guerra, Lillian. 1998. Popular Expression and National Identity in Puerto Rico. Gainsville: University 
of  Florida Press.
History Task Force. Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueños. 1979. Labor Migration Under 
Capitalism. New York, Monthly Review Press.
Horsman, Reginald. 1981. Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of  American Racial Anglo-
Saxonism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Howe, Albert H. 1901. The insular cases: comprising the records, briefs, and arguments of  
counsel in the insular cases of  the October term, 1900, in the Supreme Court of  
the United States : Washingon, D.C.
Ireland, Walter Alleyne. 1899. Tropical colonization; An Introduction to the Study of  the Subject. New 
York: MacMillan.
Jessup, Philip C. 1938. Elihu Root. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.
Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples. 1911, 187. Report 
of  the ... annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent 
Peoples.
Lowell, Abbott Lawrence. 1899a. The Colonial Expansion of  the United States. The Atlantic 
Monthly 83(496), 135–49.
———. 1899b. The Government of  the Dependencies. In The Foreign Policy of  the United States: 
Commercial and Political. 46–59. Philadelphia: The American Academy of  Political and 
Social Science.
———. 1899c. The Government of  the Dependencies. Cambridre, MA: Harvard University Press.
282 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXIX • NUMBER I • 2017
Magoon, Charles E. 1902. Reports on the law of  civil government in territory subject to 
military occupation by the military forces of  the United States. U.S. Deparment of  
War. Division of  Insular Affairs.
McDougal, H.C, 1900. Expansion and Imperialism. edited by Union Veteran Patriotic League. 
Kansas City.
Mansfield, Major F.W. 1900. Puerto Rico. Journal of  Military Service Institutions of  the United States 
27.
Meléndez, Eduardo. 2013. Citizenship and Alien Exclusion in the Insular Cases: Puerto Ricans 
in the Periphery of  the American Empire. CENTRO: Journal of  the Center for Puerto 
Rican Studies 25(1), 106–45.
Neuman, Gerald L. and Tomiko Brown-Nagin, eds. 2015. Reconsidering the Insular Cases: The Past 
and Future of  the American Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
O’Grady, James M.E. 1900. The Porto Rico Bill: Speech.
Perea, Juan. 2001. Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race and the Insular Cases. In 
Foreign in a Domestic Sense, eds. Christina and Burke Marshall Duffy Burnett. 140–66. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Pierce, Captain Palmer E. 1911. A Short History of  the Military Occupation and Government 
of  Porto Rico by the United States. Journal of  Military Service Institutions of  the United 
States 49(July-Dec), 74–89.
Rivera Ramos, Efrén. 2001. The Legal Construction of  Identity. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Roediger, David. 1991. The Wages of  Whiteness: Race and the Making of  the American Working Class. 
London. Verso.
Root, Elihu. 1899. Annual Report of  the Secretary of  War.
Sanger, Lt. Col. J. P. 1900. Report on the census of  Porto Rico, 1899. edited by U.S. War 
Department. Washington, DC. .
Schurz, Carl. 1898. Thoughts on American Imperialism. The Century Magazine 56(5), 781–87.
Smith, Edwin Burnett. 1900. Republic or Empire with Glimpses of  “Criminal Aggression.” 
Chicago: Anti Imperialist League.
Smith, Rogers. 1997. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of  Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
———. 2001. The Bitter Roots of  Puerto Rican Citizenship. In Foreign in a Domestic Sense: 
Puerto Rico, American Expansionism and the Constitution, eds. Christina Duffy Burnett 
and Burke Marshall. 373–88. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Thompson, Lanny. 2002. The Imperial Republic: A Comparison of  the Insular Territories 
under U.S. Dominion after 1898. Pacific Historical Review 71(4), 535–74.
Torruella, Juan R. 1985. The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of  Separate and Unequal. 
283Puerto Ricans as Contingent Citizens • Pedro Cabán
Río Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.
Tugwell, Rexford Guy.1977. The Stricken Land: The Story of  Puerto Rico. New York: Greenwood.
U.S. Department of  the Interior. 1894. Report on Indians taxed and Indians not taxed in the 
United States (except Alaska).
U.S. House. 1910. History Art and Archives. Foreign in a Domestic Sense. Available from 
<http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/HAIC/Historical-Essays/
Foreign-Domestic/>.
U.S. Philippine Commission. 1899. The Philippine Commission. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs. 1884, 116. Report to accompany resolution of  the 
Senate of  July 4, 1884. Washington DC.
Venator-Santiago, Charles R. 2013. Extending Citizenship to Puerto Rico: Three Traditions 
of  Inclusive Exclusion. CENTRO: Journal of  the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 25(1), 
50–75.
Warren, Kenneth. 2015. Race To Nowhere. Jacobin 18(July), 93–98.
Zimmermann, Erich W. 1940. Staff  Report to the Interdepartmental Committee on Puerto 
Rico. Washington D.C.
